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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper highlights several demand-side issues in the use of agricultural inputs by Indonesian 
farmers. A “scarcity” of subsidized fertilizer is often reported by the media. Because reliance 
on subsidized fertilizer is so complete for many Indonesian farmers, reduced availability of 
subsidized fertilizer is commonly conflated with a scarcity of all fertilizer. 
Even when cheap inputs are available, challenges remain when it comes to adopting the most 
appropriate mix of inputs. Fertilizer use in Indonesia is dominated by chemical fertilizers, 
especially subsidized urea. Overuse of urea and underuse of organic fertilizer can lead to land 
degradation over time. In addition, only 52.67% of rice farmers have adopted high-yielding 
seeds, and only 10.07% of lowland rice farming households have used hybrid seed varieties. 
This approach may make sense from the perspective of an individual farmer, but it perpetuates 
societal costs of inefficient farming practices. 
Government policies, especially fertilizer subsidies and seed subsidies/assistance, have 
contributed to suboptimal input use. The price gap between subsidized and non-subsidized 
fertilizer prices created and perpetuates an advantage for subsidized products made by state-
owned Pupuk Indonesia. The fertilizer subsidy also encourages overconsumption of chemical 
fertilizer and has led to the creation of secondary markets. The seed subsidies/assistance 
program has not improved adoption of high-yielding inbred and hybrid rice varieties. Farmer-
driven planning of the seed program, supply-side factors such as import restrictions, low 
domestic production capacity, and limited research and development, have reinforced rather 
than changed the seed preferences of farmers.
In short, rather than focusing on the production potential of high-quality input mixes, farmers 
have focused on costs distorted by government policies, existing cultivation knowledge, and 
consumer and cultural preferences. 
With fertilizer subsidies generally agreed to be ineffective, two broad alternative interventions 
have been considered by the government. Unfortunately, both of these proposals are flawed. 
One proposal, to increase the government’s purchasing price of paddy (HPP), may lead to price 
retaliation from private traders and subsequently, high prices for consumers. And replacing 
fertilizer subsidies with output subsidies creates a risk of overproduction and comes with a high 
price tag.
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This paper proposes alternative policy recommendations. In the short- and medium-term, the 
fertilizer subsidy should be eliminated and replaced with direct payments to farmers via the 
Farmer Card to close the price gap, open up competition, and increase input choices for farmers. 
The seed assistance program should be eliminated and the government should shift resources 
to helping develop a better supply of hybrid and high-yielding seed varieties to make them more 
available to farmers. Interventions should be taken to improve farmer knowledge about input 
use, especially through widespread extension services—including those that can be provided by 
the private sector. Measures should also be taken to improve the management and maintenance 
of rural infrastructure and common resources and to help increase farmers’ entrepreneurial 
capacity. Finally, program graduation should be a part of all interventions. Programs should 
have goals, indicators, and deadlines that will allow users assisted by the program to become 
independent of it or allow the government to determine when interventions are unsuccessful. 
The end goals should be improved agricultural productivity and a transition to full market 
mechanism in the agricultural input sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, seeds, and pesticide, together with fees (such as for irrigation), 
make up about 16–26% of costs per hectare per planting season for average food crops (Table 1). 
Although not as considerable a component of costs as labour (47–60% of costs), these variable 
inputs reflect farmers’ perception of the costs and benefits of higher productivity. For some of 
these inputs, farmers could rely on nature—rain for irrigation, using seeds from the previous 
planting season—but increasing yields requires investing in high-quality and carefully selected 
management of inputs. The view of inputs-as-investment prompted the Indonesian government 
to cooperate with research institutes and extension agents in the 1960s and 1970s to develop and 
urge the adoption of agricultural technologies such as high-yielding varieties and agrochemicals.
Increasing government subsidies and assistance have also aimed at productivity improvements. 
Between 2003 and 2020, the government spent IDR 319.77 trillion (USD 22.12 billion) on fertilizer 
and seed subsidies. This does not include miscellaneous assistance programs, such as those 
for irrigation rehabilitation, which are funded directly by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). But 
spending on inputs does not seem to have improved agricultural output. 
As Figure 1 shows, the year-over-year growth of subsidies for rice, maize, and soybeans has 
often fluctuated sharply—for example, the fertilizer subsidy by 142% in 2008 and the seed 
subsidy by 587% in 2013. But output growth (in rice, maize, and soybeans) has been relatively 
flat—the largest fluctuations were growth of 8.98% in 2008 and a dip of 18.42% in 2018. This 
strongly suggests that these subsidies have almost no impact on output.
Table 1.
Average Share of Agriculture Inputs in Farming Costs Per Hectare Per Farming Season, 2017
Cost
Component





















Fertilizer 1,278.00 9.43 710.59 8.40 1,370.09 13.44 449.18 4.97
Seeds 514.36 3.79 401.96 4.75 899.12 8.82 591.02 6.53




78.30 0.58 23.46 0.28 42.19 0.41 52.85 0.58
Total 2,440.21 18.00 1,432.60 16.94 2,663.42 26.12 1,456.62 16.10
Source: (Statistics Indonesia, 2019)
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Since these programs have been ineffective, this paper discusses whether such interventions 
are necessary and, if so, what form they should take. This study focuses on the demand-side 
of the input market—on farmers’ decisions as input users. While policies on the supply side are 
undoubtedly important, they entail a closer look at import policy for raw materials for fertilizer 
and seed breeding; research and development in new, more pest-resistant hybrid rice varieties;1 
investments in irrigation infrastructure and machinery; gas pricing; and so on—topics too wide-
ranging to cover in one paper. 
This paper focuses mainly on fertilizer and seeds, but proposed recommendations apply to pesticide 
and irrigation as well. The paper discusses issues in input use and existing policy interventions, 
then concludes with a call to remove market-distorting input interventions such as fertilizer 
subsidies, which stifle competition, limit farmer’s choices, and prevent farmers from shifting to 
more productive and sustainable agricultural practices. Instead, direct payment to farmers and a 
gradual transition to full market mechanism are proposed as policy recommendations.
Figure 1.
Year-Over-Year Growths of Input Subsidies and Agricultural Outputs (Rice, Maize, Soybeans)
Source: Fertilizer and seed subsidies: Ministry of Finance (2019); Agriculture outputs: 

















































1 For an analysis focused on the supply side of hybrid rice seeds, see Krishnamurti and Biru (2019). The study discusses imports 
of parental and F1 seeds, research and development of new varieties, and identifies issues such as limited production capacity 
of private seed producers due to the small number of breeders.
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ISSUES IN FARMERS’ INPUT USE
Availability
A so-called “fertilizer scarcity” is often reported in the media. This term is misleading. Shortages 
have occurred only regionally and in subsidized fertilizer. There is not a shortage of all fertilizer. 
However, the public attention given to input provision for fertilizers contributes to this confusion. 
Allocated quantities of subsidized fertilizer cover 37–51% of farmers’ 
reported fertilizer needs. In 2019 and 2020, the gap between the subsidized 
quantities provided and those demanded ranged between 1.04 and 5.71 
million tonnes (Table 2). The widest gap appears in organic fertilizer, 
which reflects the subsidy program’s concentration in chemical fertilizer. 
The gap between quantity of fertilizer demanded and quantity subsidized 
is seldom recognized in public discourse about fertilizer availability. Farmers, supported by media 
reporting, appear to expect the government to fully subsidize national fertilizer needs.
Table 2.
Subsidized Fertilizer Quantities Requested vs Provided (tonnes)




Quantities Requested Quantities Allocated Quantities Requested Quantities Allocated
ZA 2,203,612.80 996,000   1,892,760.63 850,000
NPK     5,894,354.91 2,326,000   4,399,153.22 2,688,000
SP-36     2,792,945.16 779,000   1,871,674.58 600,000
Urea     5,861,773.41 3,825,000   4,183,263.85 4,025,467
Organic     6,653,792.99 948,000   5,058,738.53 720,000
Total 23,406,479.27 8,874,000 17,405,590.81 8,883,467
Challenges for farmers caused by the shortfall of subsidized fertilizer supplied compared to 
demand are compounded by misallocations and delays. Misallocations occur when plantation 
companies and farmers not affiliated with an eligible Farmer Group (Kelompok Tani or Poktan)2 
received subsidized fertilizer, as reported in MOA (2020c). The same report found that subsidized 
fertilizers available to East Java farmers in July 2020—more than halfway into the fiscal year—
were only 50% of the requested amount due to the local government’s late submission of the 
2 According to MOA Regulation No. 67/2016 on Farmer’s Institutional Development, a Farmer Group is a group of farmers/breed-
ers/planters formed on the basis of common interests; common social, economic, and resource conditions; common commod-
ities; and cooperation to improve and develop the business of its members. In practice, membership in a Farmer Group has 
become the basic requirement for farmers to access subsidies, assistance, and extension services.
Allocated quantities 
of subsidized fertilizer 
cover 37–51% of farmers’ 
reported fertilizer needs. 
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3 An RDKK is a document prepared by farmers in a Farmer Group with assistance from an extension officer that details the 
expected agricultural input, tools, and machinery needs for a planting season. The document reports types of commodities 
and area harvested, quantities of inputs (fertilizer, seeds, pesticide, tools, etc.) needed, and source of funding (private expens-
es, loans, government assistance/subsidies). In the context of this paper, RDKK refers specifically to RDKK Pupuk Bersubsidi, 
which is a special type of RDKK used in requesting the quantities and types of subsidized fertilizer for farmers in a region in one 
planting season. Unlike a regular RDKK, which is mainly an internal planning document, RDKK Pupuk Bersubsidi is proposed 
by farmers and verified and collected in a hierarchical manner by the government’s agricultural offices from the local to the 
national levels. More information is available from MOA Regulation No. 67/2016 on Farmer’s Institutional Development.
4 Dams are managed by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing and its vertical agencies at the local level.
Farmer Group proposal (known as Rencana Definitif Kebutuhan Kelompok Tani Pupuk Bersubsidi—
hereinafter RDKK).3 This illustrates how the long bureaucratic process for subsidy planning and 
allocation contributes to scarcity. When subsidized fertilizers are not available, farmers are 
faced with choosing to buy non-subsidized fertilizers at higher prices or to reduce their use of 
fertilizers and risk lower yields.
Availability is an issue facing irrigation as well. In Indonesia, the main irrigation infrastructure 
consists of government-managed dams  that provide irrigation, raw water supplies for industry 
and households, and electricity generation. The government is responsible for building and 
managing waterways of the primary and secondary irrigation systems. Primary irrigation 
systems start with a main headwork (e.g., a dam, a reservoir) located along a body of water 
(e.g., a river) that diverts water from the source and into the primary canal. The waterways of 
the secondary system tap into the primary canal. Unlike with water for domestic and industrial 
use, which is supplied to the end-users by utility companies, farm plots (an area of 25–150ha) 
are serviced by a tertiary irrigation system managed by farmers. Irrigation at the farm level is 
managed by the Association of Water-User Farmers (Perkumpulan Petani Pemakai Air or P3A)—a 
semi-formal communal agency that aims:
to increase irrigation efficiency at farm level, to distribute water equally and fairly 
at tertiary irrigation canals, to check and maintain the tertiary canals and, to plan 
infrastructure improvement programs, to manage planting schedule and cropping 
pattern, to manage irrigation services fee, and to dim the potential conflict in water 
distribution. (Syaukat et al., 2014, p. 164)
Fair access to water from irrigation systems remains a concern. The 
simple organization and management capabilities of P3As does not 
equip them to maintain consistent water service delivery across farming 
areas. A study in Yogyakarta reported that rice farmers in upstream 
areas could plant up to three times a year, while those downstream, with 
more restricted water supply, only managed to plant twice (Syaukat & 
Siwi, 2009). This is a potential source of communal conflict. 
The government’s role in irrigation is mostly one of infrastructure 
investment funded through savings from fuel subsidies (OECD, 2020). The 
government also provides assistance for rehabilitating select irrigation 
systems at the tertiary level. As with fertilizer and seeds, this assistance 
is provided based on Farmer Group proposals. The targeted coverage for 
irrigation is much smaller than for fertilizer and seed assistance. Only 
33% of rehabilitation proposals were targeted by the program in 2019 
(MOA, 2021). For comparison, in the same year fertilizer subsidies were 
Fair access to water 
from irrigation systems 
remains a concern. The 
simple organization 
and management 
capabilities of P3As 
does not equip them 
to maintain consistent 
water service delivery 
across farming areas.
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intended to cover 68% of all fertilizer needs (although the real available quantities are much 
lower, as discussed in subsequent sections).
Farmers are required to pay irrigation service fees to the P3A, intended to cover operations and 
maintenance (O&M). The pricing is determined on a per-area basis of the farm rather than by 
volume of use, which is how water is priced for household and industrial use. However, a study 
in two villages in Bogor and Kudus districts reported that payment has not been strictly enforced 
and most farmers (66%) do not pay due to their belief that water delivery and services by the 
P3A are unsatisfactory (Syaukat et al., 2014). Low payment and dissatisfaction is despite the 
relatively small fees—ranging between IDR 25,000–350,000 per hectare per planting season 
with a median of IDR 100,000–120,000 (Interview 6; Rahman et al., 2019; Syaukat et al., 2014). 
Several studies on farmers’ willingness to pay suggest that farmers are willing not only to pay, 
but to pay a higher rate if service quality improves (Rahman et al., 2019; Syaukat et al., 2014).
5 Data on organic fertilizer use are not available.
Adoption of High-Yielding and Diverse Inputs
A second problem facing agricultural productivity is failure to adopt high-yielding inputs and a 
balanced variation of inputs. 
Fertilizer use in Indonesia has historically been dominated by chemical fertilizers, especially 
urea. The popularity of chemical fertilizers in Indonesia began with their intensive introduction to 
food crop farmers in the 1960s (Suryana, 2019). Three urea factories were established in 1974, 
followed by nine factories in 1974–1986, and two more in 1986–1994 (Rachman & Sudaryanto, 
2010, pp. 194-195). Table 3 illustrates the dominance of urea use by farmers.
Urea is the world’s most popular nitrogenous fertilizer. It is cheap to mass produce and transport, 
has a high concentration of nitrogen (which helps leaf growth), and is instantly absorbed by 
plants to give quick, observable results. However, urea overuse makes crops vulnerable to pests 
and diseases, causes plants to collapse (Stevens et al., 1999), and pollutes groundwater (Fageria 
Fertilizer 
Type
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
ZA  731,044 962,970 1,049,898 1,094,742 1,008,525 994,759 1,021,348 979,473 1,004,034 
NPK 1,804,413 2,124,474 2,478,399 2,443,456 2,672,052 2,705,807 2,933,716 2,597,586 2,802,246 
SP-36  634,883  723,177  858,719  830,638  798,254  829,134  865,434  859,965  861,614 
Urea  5,131,287  5,245,493  5,119,133  4,771,070  4,993,060  4,790,930  5,020,625  5,123,183  5,665,007 
Table 3.
Agricultural Use of Chemical Fertilizers in Indonesia (Tonnes)5
Source: FAOSTAT (FAO, 2021a).
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Optimal and Sustainable Use of Inputs
Productivity is determined as much by how inputs are used as by their availability and 
quality. Beginning in the early 2000s, the Indonesian Agency for Agricultural Research and 
Development (IAARD) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) developed Integrated 
Crop Management (ICM) recommendations (in Indonesian, Pengelolaan Tanaman Terpadu (PTT)). 
ICM was designed to reverse declining rice productivity by encouraging farmers to adopt a set 
of technologies and techniques including new seed varieties, intermittent irrigation, balanced 
nitrogen fertilization, and introduction of organic matter or compost (Balasubramanian et al., 
1998; Wardana et al., 2016). 
A few years later, MOA Regulation No. 40/2007 passed. It recommends 175–275 kilograms of 
urea per hectare as the appropriate dose of urea (based on leaf color charts6) and that it be 
& Virupax, 1999). Chemical fertilizer overuse over time damages the nutrient balance of soil and 
leads to land degradation (Darwis & Saptana, 2010), runoff pollution, and increased greenhouse 
gas emissions (ADB, 2019). 
In addition to nitrogen (N), fertilization should ideally introduce other important macronutrients such 
as phosphorus (P) and potassium (K), which can be provided by compound fertilizers such as NPK.
Organic fertilizer use improves soil structure, micronutrient and microbial composition, water 
retention, and the efficacy of inorganic fertilizer (Darwis & Saptana, 2010). However, organic 
fertilizers such as compost, manure, and plant waste are less available commercially. Farmers 
or small-scale industries can produce organic fertilizers using farm waste, but they are difficult 
to transport and apply, especially over large agricultural areas. Farmer Group need proposals 
(RDKK) in recent years (Table 2) indicate huge demand for organic fertilizers, larger than even 
their requests for urea. Nutrients in organic fertilizers are less concentrated and less precisely 
composed than chemical fertilizers, and so much larger volumes are needed. Five to six tonnes 
of fresh rice straw or two tonnes of compost per hectare provide nutrients equivalent to 25–30 kg 
of urea, 5–10 kg of SP-36, and 50–60 kg of KCl (Rachman & Sudaryanto, 2010). Organic fertilizers 
are intended as complements to chemical fertilizers, not as substitutes.
In 2021, the government increased subsidized organic fertilizer to 2.27 million tonnes (MOA Regulation 
No. 49/2020), but this still fell short of the requested amount. The supply gap represents opportunities 
for the private sector to supply organic fertilizers and develop more nutrient-dense varieties.
Adoption of high-yielding seed varieties is still low. Only 52.67% of rice farmers have used government-
certified high-yielding seeds (MOA, 2018a). Adoption of hybrid varieties was even more disappointing, 
with only 10.07% of lowland rice farming households using the seeds in 2020 (Statistics Indonesia, 
2021a). The government has long championed the development of premium and enhanced rice seed 
varieties, including zinc-biofortified rice, through publicly funded research and development. This 
support has led to the creation of hundreds of new rice varieties in recent decades. 
For maize seeds, farmers perceive a quality gap between the (often-subsidized) government-
certified hybrid seeds and those produced by private companies, with the former reportedly capable 
of yielding 3–5 tonnes per hectare and the latter 7–10 tonnes per hectare (Freddy & Gupta, 2018).
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administered together with two tonnes of manure per hectare. An experimental study by Sholeh 
and Ringgih (2017) recommends a combination of 200–250 kilograms of urea per hectare and 1–6 
tonnes of organic fertilizer per hectare for an optimal yield increase. This regulation also provides 
location-specific phosphorus and potassium fertilizer recommendations based on macronutrient 
characteristics of farm plots at the sub-district level. These recommendations serve as a basis 
for subsidy allocation for different kinds of fertilizer. Many studies have confirmed that location-
specific ICM boosts yields and improves efficiency (e.g., Arafah & Sahardi, 2007; Balitkabi, 2016; 
Las et al., 2004; Nurbaeti et al., 2008). The new crop management system resulted in 20% higher 
yields and 35% more income for rice farmers (Zaini & Erythrina, 2008).
Farmers’ fertilizer use patterns initially indicated an “overdose” of urea, prompting the MOA to 
promote ICM and balanced fertilization in the early 2000s. Studies indicate a shift in fertilizer 
administration patterns between 2000 and 2014 for wetland rice farming (Table 4). In 2000, 
the average urea use among Javanese farmers was 360.1 kilograms per hectare with almost 
no organic fertilizers (Suryana et al., 2016). In 2007—the year MOA Regulation No. 40 was 
implemented—urea was applied at lower concentrations, ranging from 36 kilograms per hectare 
in South Sulawesi to 295 kilograms per hectare in West Java.
Organic fertilizer use in 2007 was reported at 4.6% of farmers, with negligible use outside Java 
(Irawan et al., 2007). Osorio et al. (2011) provided higher estimates: 170–343 kilograms of urea were 
reportedly used per hectare in 2007. The study also shows an inverse relationship between urea 
use and average land size—in other words, urea use increases as the land size of a farm becomes 
smaller. This suggests the distorting effect of subsidized fertilizers, especially urea, on farmer’s input 
use decisions. Brief removal of fertilizer subsidies in 1999–2001 “led small farmers to substitute 
alternative inputs (other fertilizer, better seeds) for urea” (Osorio et al., 2011, p. 7). By 2014, average 
urea use in Java had fallen considerably, to 187.20 kilograms per hectare, while organic fertilizer use 
soared to 593.80 kilograms per hectare (Suryana et al., 2016). More recent data were not found.
6 Leaf color indicates a plant’s nitrogen status. The more yellowish green a leaf is, the more nitrogen deficient it is; conversely, a 
darker green leaf indicates higher rate of nitrogen. The measurement is usually conducted using a leaf colour chart and is an 
inexpensive way to determine nitrogen fertilizer needs more accurately.
Table 4.
Average Use of Urea and Organic Fertilizers in Wetland Rice Farming, 
2000, 2007, 2013, 2014 (in kg/ha)
Source: * Suryana et al. (2016); ** Irawan et al. (2007); *** Osorio et al. (2011); **** Statistics Indonesia (2015)
Year Urea Organic
2000* 360.10 20.20
2007** 136-295 no data
2007*** 170-343 no data
2013**** 104.60-252.30 no data
2014* 187.20 593.80
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Reduced urea application and increased organic fertilizer use from 2000–2014 indicates that 
farmers improved their practices, possibly because of improved access to different input types 
and extension services. However, organic fertilizer use is still far below the recommended level, 
suggesting insufficient supplies and incentives.
As with fertilizer, the use of pesticide can affect immediate productivity and sustainability in the 
long term. Chemical pesticides applied excessively and without attention to safety requirements 
can affect organisms other than pests, such as humans, fish, bees and other pollinators, and the 
broader environment. Good pest control practices should be encouraged to balance productivity 
concerns from underuse against potential downsides from overuse. 
Pesticide use is tied to several factors. Based on a survey involving 240 Javanese vegetable 
farmers, Mariyono et al. (2018) show several important takeaways regarding farmers’ pesticide use 
pattern. First, pesticide is a protective, not productive input. Its use reflects farmers’ anticipation 
of or response to pest infestation and varies widely depending on the crops’ vulnerability to pests 
and disease. The study shows that farmers administered almost three times more pesticide for 
local crop varieties compared to hybrid varieties (p. 13). Moreover, pesticide price does not appear 
to influence the quantities used—pesticide use is price inelastic: “[a] 10% increase in the price of 
pesticide can only reduce the use of pesticides by 0.9%” (p. 17). This implies that taxes or subsidies 
are expected to be ineffective to discourage or encourage pesticide use.
According to FAO, average pesticide use by area in Indonesia has been low (0.04 kg/ha) and 
stagnant in the past three decades compared to other East Asian agrarian countries (Figure 
2). This statistics should be treated carefully as it shows that total pesticide use in Indonesia 
remains the same at 1,597 tonnes since 1993. Meanwhile, Prihandiani et al. (2021) claim that 
pesticide has been used nationally at an alarming rate since the early 2000s, though the study 
provides data from two villages only, each in Indramayu and Klaten.












1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Figure 2.
Pesticide Use Per Area of Cropland in Some East Asian Countries, 1990–2018
Source: FAOSTAT (FAO, 2021b).
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EXISTING POLICY INTERVENTIONS ON INPUTS
Fertilizer Subsidies
Fertilizer subsidies have become an integral part of Indonesian agriculture policies since their 
introduction in 1971. Despite a levelling out of outputs in recent years, intensive fertilizer use 
encouraged by subsidies doubled rice production from 20 million tonnes in the early 1970s to 
51 million tonnes in 2002 (FAO, 2005). According to Ruslan (2021), 99% of lowland rice farming 
households in Java have used fertilizer, but a sizable portion (6.38%) of these households in 
regions outside Java have not. Applying fertilizer in these lowland rice farming areas outside 
Java could increase productivity by 48% (Ruslan, 2021). This suggests that some targeted 
promotion of fertilizer use remains worthwhile. However, subsidies have become a heavy fiscal 
burden for the government, leaping from IDR 0.90 trillion (USD 62.20 million) in 2003 to IDR 26.63 
trillion (USD 1.84 billion) in 2020 (Figure 3).
Fertilizer subsidies are not paid to farmers. Instead, they are paid to Pupuk Indonesia as part 
of its public service obligation (PSO) contract to lower the production costs of its fertilizer 
products. Pupuk Indonesia is the holding company of five state-owned fertilizer producers: 
Petrokimia Gresik, Pupuk Kujang, Pupuk Kalimantan Timur, Pupuk Iskandar Muda, and Pupuk 
Sriwidjaya. It enjoys a dominant position in Indonesia’s fertilizer market and a near monopoly 
in urea production. On top of receiving subsidies, the fertilizer industry at large also benefits 
from a government policy that caps natural gas prices at USD 6 per mmBtu (Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 8/2020). Natural gas is an important raw material in the 
production of ammonia and urea.
The fertilizer subsidy is regulated in 2021 by MOA Regulation No. 49/2020, which sets the 
maximum retail price and the allocation of subsidized fertilizer for the year. The subsidy covers 
urea, SP-36, ZA, NPK, and organic fertilizer products from Pupuk Indonesia. Figure 3 illustrates 
how subsidy expenditures have increased over time. Urea has dominated the allocation, with an 
average of 4.30 million tonnes of fertilizer per year. Meanwhile, the average annual quantities 
for SP-36, ZA, NPK, and organic fertilizer are 0.81, 0.86, 1.74, and 0.81 million tonnes. Subsidized 
organic fertilizer has been one of the least available, despite high farmer demand. The greater 
focus on chemical fertilizers may contribute to the excessive use of urea discussed earlier and 
supported by interviews (Interviews 5, 6). As with the government’s food policy, which aims 
at domestic self-sufficiency, fertilizer subsidies have a strong populist appeal. The budget 
for subsidies always rose in the lead-up to an election year, and only in the mid-term has an 
administration been willing to reduce the allocation.
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Subsidized fertilizers are reserved for farmers who are members of a Farmer Group and 
manage up to two hectares of land per planting season for food crops, plantation, horticulture, 
and animal husbandry (MOA Regulation No. 49/2020). Most (89.09%) of Indonesian farmers 
manage less than two hectares of land (Statistics Indonesia, 2018). Meanwhile, 68.82% of 
farmers are members of Farmer Groups (Statistics Indonesia, 2021a). Tenant farmers and 
laborers may receive subsidies with the land owner’s permission (Interview 4). The quantities 
and types of fertilizer allocated per farmer per hectare are determined by considering requests 
in the need proposal (RDKK). The long, bottom-up process to request and receive the subsidized 
fertilizer is illustrated in Figure 4.
Input provision to farmers managing or owning up to two hectares of land 
is mandated by Law No. 19/2013 on the Protection and Empowerment 
of Farmers. Any effort to reconsider the protection scope will therefore 
require an amendment to this Law, especially its Article 12.
The long, complex application and distribution process has contributed 
to subsidized fertilizer arriving late into the planting season or becoming 
available only in limited supplies (Interviews 1, 2, 3). A farmer informant 
even reported that an official from the local District Office of Agriculture 
asks for a fee from the Farmer Group for the administration of subsidized 
fertilizer every planting season (Interview 2). 
Subsidized fertilizer is still the preferred choice for most farmers. According to the 2013 
Agriculture Census (MOA, 2015), 41.71% of farmers rely exclusively on subsidized fertilizer. 
When subsidized fertilizer is not available, some farmers purchase the non-subsidized brands. 
Figure 3.
Fertilizer Subsidy Budget (Right Scale) and Quantity of Subsidized Fertilizer 
(Left Scale), 2003 – 2020
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Smallholder farmers, however, cannot afford these products and would rather reduce their 
fertilizer use or rely on compost (Interviews 2, 3). Such behaviour indicates that cost, not yield 
potential from optimal fertilization, is still the main factor determining how farmers use fertilizer.
Source: Adapted from Director General of Agriculture Inputs and Infrastructure Decree No. 01/2021 on Technical 
Guideline for the Management of Subsidized Fertilizer, Fiscal Year 2021; Corruption Eradication Commission, 2017.
Figure 4.
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Subsidized fertilizer cannot be sold above a Maximum Retail Price (MRP), evaluated annually 
and set in an MOA Regulation. The MRP policy has allowed farmers to purchase fertilizer at 
an affordable price, but widened the gap between the prices of subsidized and non-subsidized 
fertilizer. This is especially the case between the price of fertilizer produced by Pupuk Indonesia 
and private producers’ brands. Table 5 illustrates this price gap, which ranges from 2.5 to 6 times 
subsidized price for chemical fertilizers, and about 4 to 26 times subsidized price for organic 
fertilizers. The variation is due to the larger number of choices in commercial fertilizer products. 
For example, there is only one subsidized NPK type: Phonska, which contains 15% nitrogen, 15% 
phosphorus, and 15% potassium (15-15-15). Other types of NPK in the non-subsidized market 
offer different ratio, such as NPK 16-16-16, or NPK fertilizers that also contain micronutrients 
such as boron and zinc. These different formulas suit the needs of different crops and soil.
In addition to price gaps between subsidized fertilizer from Pupuk Indonesia and non-subsidized 
fertilizer provided by the private sector, a significant difference exists between subsidized and 
non-subsidized fertilizers produced by Pupuk Indonesia itself. Pupuk Indonesia (2021) charged 
on average IDR 1,465 per kilogram of subsidized fertilizer sold. The corresponding number for its 
non-subsidized products is IDR 3,771—2.5 times more expensive than the subsidized products.
Total subsidies received by Pupuk Indonesia in 2020 amounted to IDR 25.71 trillion, which 
made up 35.77% of the company’s total revenue. When including the subsidies in the revenue 
calculation, the per-kilogram revenue from subsidized fertilizer became IDR 4,515, significantly 
higher than what the company earned per kilogram of non-subsidized fertilizer (Table 6). 
The per-kilogram average revenue at IDR 4,515 is more in line with the non-subsidized prices 
presented in Table 5, suggesting that subsidies contribute significantly to the price disparity. 
Table 5.
Subsidized MRP and Non-Subsidized Fertilizer Prices
Source: MOA Regulation No. 1/2020 & MOA Regulation No. 49/2020; author’s compilation 
from several marketplaces (for non-subsidized prices).





Urea 1,800 2,250 5,600 – 5,990
SP-36 2,000 2,400 5,995 – 9,396
ZA 1,400 1,700 3,650 – 4,600
NPK 2,300 2,300
7,000 – 13,500
NPK Special Formula 3,000 3,300
Organic 500 - 3,300 – 8,000
Organic granule - 800 3,000 – 21,000




From 2015 to 2020, subsidies effectively 
supported 67.45% of Pupuk Indonesia’s 
subsidized fertilizer. 
Subsidies also cover costs that occur in the 
production process of subsidized and non-
subsidized items, such as labor. This is in line 
with the findings from the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
or KPK). A 2017 report found that subsidy 
calculation is based on a full-costing approach that allows the appointed producer to charge all 
fertilizer production costs, including those incurred in the production of non-subsidized products 
(KPK, 2017). According to MOA Regulation No. 28/2020 on the Components of Cost of Goods 
Sold for Subsidized Fertilizer in the Agriculture Sector, Pupuk Indonesia is allowed to include 
many indirect cost components, including almost all salaries, in the production cost. According 
to MOF Regulation No. 68/2016 on the Allocation, Disbursement, and Accountability of Fertilizer 
Subsidies, subsidies payable is simply cost of goods sold (COGS) minus the maximum retail price 
(MRP). This encourages the appointed producer to overestimate the COGS, since higher COGS 
means larger subsidy payment.
A 2017 report found that subsidy 
calculation is based on a full-costing 
approach that allows the appointed 
producer to charge all fertilizer production 
costs, including those incurred in the 
production of non-subsidized products
Table 6.
Pupuk Indonesia’s Revenue Breakdown
Source: author’s calculation based on Pupuk Indonesia (2021).
Subsidized fertilizer 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Sales (IDR trillion) 12.42 13.16 13.22 13.39 12.49 12.35
Subsidies received




38.22 39.93 38.18 41.96 40.49 38.06
Quantities sold (tonnes) 8,881,084 9,181,396 9,297,956 9,340,238 8,708,912 8,430,114
Revenue per kg (IDR) 4,304 4,349 4,107 4,492 4,649 4,515
Non-subsidized fertilizer 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Total revenue
(IDR trillion) 10.63 9.15 10.03 14.07 15.85 18.64
Quantities sold (tonnes) 2,880,486 2,913,916 3,207,198 3,460,377 3,897,150 4,943,888
Revenue per kg (IDR) 3,690 3,142 3,128 4,067 4,067 3,771
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To encourage organic fertilizer use, the MOA also provides funding assistance for the 
development of organic fertilizer plants. Funding is based on proposals from the Farmer 
Groups, which include a detailed description of the funding needs and spending plan and a 
commitment to report program implementation and budget use. In 2021, the program targets 
the establishment of 1100 units of organic fertilizer plants with a budget of IDR 200 million per 
unit (Director General of Agriculture Inputs and Infrastructure Decree No. 15/2021 on Technical 
Guideline on Fertilizer Activities Toward Organic Farming Fiscal Year 2021).
The subsidy has created an unfair advantage for certain 
products and producers and encourages overconsumption 
of certain fertilizers. The price gap has also led to the 
creation of secondary markets in which recipients of 
subsidized fertilizer sell their allocations to non-recipients. 
Farmer Card (Kartu Tani)
The Farmer Card was introduced to combat secondary markets for subsidized fertilizer. This 
card is used to claim and pay for an individual farmer’s subsidized fertilizer quota. The Farmer 
Card was first implemented through MOA Regulation No. 47/2017 on the Allocation and Highest 
Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizer for the Agriculture Sector Fiscal Year 2018. 
The idea to use a “smart card” to prevent leakage and deliver subsidies directly to eligible 
farmers was not new. In 2007 and 2008, the MOA conducted “smart card” trials in 15 districts 
from 12 provinces. The evaluation concluded that the system was promising, but plagued with 
technical difficulties (Sudjono, 2011).
At the time of writing, distribution and farmer adoption of the cards are inadequate and uneven 
throughout the country. In 2020, almost three years after introduction, the MOA reported that 
9.30 million cards had been printed (66.91% of all 13.90 million eligible farmers) and 6.20 
million cards had been distributed (44.60% of eligible farmers), but only 1.20 million farmers 
(8.63% of eligible farmers) had actually used it (MOA, 2020a). One chili farmer interviewed in 
Batam claimed that their Farmer Group only received the Farmer Cards in April 2021 after a long 
application process (Interview 2).
The card also functions as a debit card on which farmers need to maintain a minimum 
balance in order to keep their account open. To obtain the card, they open a bank account in an 
appointed state-owned bank. It is not necessary to pay for the allocated fertilizer quota from 
their balance, since payments with cash while showing the card is also possible. Used this way, 
the card is reduced to a verification tool and in effect is more like a fertilizer voucher than a 
smart card, but creates the requirement that farmers maintain a minimum balance with a bank 
they may not otherwise use.
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The card in its current form is redundant and preserves most of the weaknesses of the subsidy system. 
1. Despite its payment function and the associated account, farmers do not receive financial 
assistance for input purchases through the Farmer Card. Instead, each card contains 
information about subsidized fertilizer quantities (as determined based on the RDKK and 
the government budget) available for purchase by the cardholder. Farmers still need to pay 
with their own cash or load the card with a balance.
2. The card preserves the price disparity between subsidized and non-subsidized products 
and with it the distortionary effects of the subsidy. Not only does this encourage 
overconsumption of certain subsidized input types, but in the long run subsidies hinder 
the efforts to raise awareness of optimal fertilization according to soil characteristics and 
macro- or micronutrient needs and discourage the development of new, more varied, and 
more affordable private sector fertilizers.
3. The card still limits farmers’ options to one input (fertilizer) and then only to subsidized 
fertilizer produced by Pupuk Indonesia.
4. The card preserves the long, bureaucratic process of applying for and receiving subsidized 
fertilizer through RDKK.
5. The primary function of the Farmer Card is to identify eligible recipients and prevent non-
recipients from accessing subsidized fertilizer. However, so long as the price disparity 
exists, recipients are free to purchase and re-sell their fertilizer allocation for more than 
they paid but less than the price of non-subsidized fertilizer. In addition, some kiosks in 
Boyolali reportedly require farmers to purchase subsidized fertilizer together with other 
products as a bundle, illustrating how the voucher system is ineffective at deterring 
gatekeeper corruption:
The distributors usually require [purchase of] other fertilizer for redemption [of subsidized 
fertilizer]. For example, you want to redeem several kilograms of urea. In order to do that, 
you have to also purchase several kilograms of Petroganik [a brand of organic fertilizer 
produced by Pupuk Indonesia]. … [A farmer said,] “Wait, this is not in the list [of recommended 
inputs]. Why do I need to purchase this? I have my own organic fertilizer, why do I need to 
purchase Petroganik?” (Interview 5)
6. Additional functions are being integrated in the Farmer Card. These include facilitating 
direct offtake agreements with the state-owned logistics company Bulog, access to an 
Indonesian government-run microlending facility, the People’s Business Credit (Kredit 
Usaha Rakyat or KUR), and access to social assistance. By relying on data from the RDKK, the 
MOA intends to leverage the Farmer Card to integrate data on agriculture, such as farmer 
identity and harvested area by commodity and region (Balingtan, 2020). However, like the 
card itself, these features have apparently not been uniformly available and effectively 
implemented. An interviewed farmer confirmed these functions, but also complained that 
their effectiveness is limited by middlemen in the farmer’s community and complicated 
KUR application process (Interview 2). Another farmer reported that only the KUR feature 
has been available among the additional functions (Interview 3).
7. Because of the slow and incomplete rollout, the MOA still allows farmers to purchase 
subsidized fertilizer without the Farmer Card by simply showing their identity card 
and verifying against the database (e-RDKK) (Director General of Agriculture Inputs 
and Infrastructure Decree No. 01/2021 on Technical Guideline for the Management of 
25
Subsidized Fertilizer, Fiscal Year 2021). This may discourage meaningful progress in the 
card’s adoption and distribution.
Despite these shortcomings in implementation, the Farmer Card and its additional features 
represent a promising concept and infrastructure for direct input-support targeting and 
integration of financing options, social assistance, and incentives in one place. Direct subsidies 
targeted to farmers and integrated services through the Farmer Card would help modernize 
the Indonesian agriculture. It also has the potential for integrated data collection on land use, 
production, farmer behaviour, and socioeconomic status, which could be leveraged to develop 
and improve a direct payment and incentive system and generally improve agricultural statistics.
Seed Assistance Program (Program Bantuan Benih)
As with fertilizer subsidies, the Indonesian government has long intervened in seed provision. 
Intervention started in 1986 (Firdaus, 2018) and is mostly conducted via subsidies and a seed 
assistance program in cooperation with the state-owned seed producers, Sang Hyang Seri (SHS) 
and Pertani.7 Subsidy values ranged between IDR 60 – 2,177 billion (USD 4 – 150 million) annually 
from 2005 to 2017 (Figure 5), far below the fiscal burden of fertilizer subsidies. In 2018, the 
MOA ended the subsidy program and has since relied solely on seed assistance, which provides 
eligible farmers with free seeds.
7 In Indonesian public finance, both subsidies and assistance are payments made by the government for the provision of goods or 
services for public use. By definition, subsidies are paid to state-owned or private producers to reduce the costs of production 
of goods or services that are deemed essential for public welfare. Assistance is the government’s procurement of goods or 
services provided to specific target recipients. The difference is mostly procedural, where subsidies offset production costs, 
while assistance programs procure a set of items or services with certain specifications. In the context of the seed subsidies vs 
assistance, the only relevant difference is that subsidies discounted the price of seeds available in shops, while the assistance 
program directly provides free seeds to recipients.
Source: Ministry of Finance (MOF), 2019.
Figure 5.
Seed Subsidies, 2005–2017 (IDR Billion)
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The shift from subsidies to assistance as a method for government seed provisions appears to 
be a response to pervasive inefficiency in seed distribution. A study commissioned by the MOA to 
review subsidy implementation in South Sumatra reported that subsidized seed uptake in 2016 
was extremely low. Only 9% of subsidized inbred rice seeds and no subsidized hybrid rice seeds 
were actually purchased by farmers (Darwis, 2017). The finding was in line with a statement 
from the MOA reporting a meagre 5% uptake in 2015 (MOA, 2018c). Low uptake has several 
causes: the subsidy program was competing with the simultaneous seed assistance program; 
the bottom-up recipient registration and proposal submission was slow; and farmers sometimes 
changed their seed preference at the start of a planting season, so that their preferred seeds 
were different from the ones in their original proposal (Darwis, 2017).
Seed assistance is expected to solve the low uptake issue and simplify the process by giving 
farmers free seeds. Seed assistance was part of MOA programs to boost productivity, notably 
the Special Efforts (Upaya Khusus or UPSUS) program to provide farmers with high-yielding 
inbred and hybrid rice seeds, hybrid maize seeds, and soybean seeds. UPSUS included other 
components, such as improvements to irrigation networks, land optimization, fertilizer provision, 
and tools and machinery provision. The UPSUS mandate ended in 2018 and seed assistance 
began to fall under a different program each year. 
Despite these programs, adoption of high-yielding inbred and hybrid varieties is still poor, 
especially for rice. From the MOA’s Statistics of Agriculture Infrastructure and Inputs 2020 (MOA, 
2020b), the three most planted rice varieties in Indonesia are Ciherang (3.71 million hectares), 
Mekongga (1.54 million hectares), and miscellaneous local varieties (0.94 million hectares). 
None of these are hybrid, nor are they new varieties—Ciherang and Mekongga were released 
in 2000 and 2004. Official figures state that the average yields of Ciherang and Mekongga are 
respectively 5–7 and 6 tonnes of dried unmilled rice (GKG) per 
hectare (Sasmita et al., 2020), though an interview suggests these 
varieties in reality yield about five tonnes per hectare (Interview 
8). In contrast, the hybrid variety HIPA 21, released in 2019, has 
an average yield of 8.99 tonnes of dried unmilled rice per hectare 
(Sasmita et al., 2020). The popularity of local varieties might also 
be a concern for productivity, especially in the case of uncertified 
varieties with unknown yield potential.
Low adoption of high-yielding and hybrid rice varieties may be explained by several factors on 
both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, imports of certified seeds have been 
made conditional on the availability of domestic supplies, the production capacity of private 
seed producers is limited, and research and development of new varieties suited to local 
preferences is limited (Krishnamurti & Biru, 2019).8 On the demand side, farmer preference, 
as demonstrated by the dominant use of old varieties, seems to be driven by consumer 
preferences and farmers’ culture.
Each rice variety has a certain texture, and farmers respond to diverse consumer preferences for 
rice by planting a variety of seeds. Krishnamurti and Biru (2019) provide an overview of how the 
8 See Krishnamurti and Biru (2019) for an extensive discussion of hybrid rice availability in Indonesia.
Despite these programs, 
adoption of high-yielding 
inbred and hybrid varieties is 
still poor, especially for rice.
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preferred Javanese’s texture compares to that in Sumatra, in 
Kalimantan, and in other parts of the archipelago. Ciherang 
results in fluffier rice, suiting the Javanese preference. 
Because Javanese is the dominant ethnic group and thus 
a large consumer segment, many farmers are probably 
catering to Javanese customers by growing Ciherang.
Rice farming appears also to be influenced by culture or 
habits. Some farmers feel culturally obligated to preserve 
local varieties, planting the same seeds over generations. In these cases, farmers can be reluctant 
to try new methods (Interviews 1, 3, 7, 8). This stands in stark contrast to maize, for which hybrid 
seeds make up 80–90% of the cultivated varieties in Indonesia (Syahruddin et al., 2020). Maize 
has transitioned from a staple foodstuff to industrial raw materials. The industrial use of maize 
may explain why the market for hybrid maize seeds has been easier to develop (Interview 1).
Most importantly, policy interventions have accommodated and reinforced existing preferences. 
As with fertilizer subsidies, seed assistance uses bottom-up planning that starts with farmers 
in a Farmer Group filling in a Farmer and Location Candidate (Calon Petani Calon Lokasi or CPCL) 
form.9 Therefore, the low uptake of subsidized seeds and meagre adoption of high-yielding 
varieties are the result not only of inefficient distribution, but also of the fact that distribution 
relies on farmers’ proposals. Relying on farmer proposals is most likely to result in requests for 
tried-and-true methods rather than experimentation and education about more varieties.
9 See Freddy and Gupta (2018) for a detailed description of seed assistance planning and distribution process.
Relying on farmer proposals is 
most likely to result in requests 
for tried-and-true methods 
rather than experimentation and 
education about more varieties.
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ELIMINATION OF FERTILIZER SUBSIDIES
Many studies, including some published by the MOA, have acknowledged the economic and 
logistical inefficiencies and poor productivity improvements under the fertilizer subsidy (e.g., 
Armas et al., 2012; Kholis & Setiaji, 2020; Rachman & Sudaryanto, 2010; Rachman, 2012; Susila, 
2010). However, the complete elimination of the subsidy remains unpopular. Most reformers 
have suggested improving the system through tweaks to improve targeting, supervision, and 
control of the distribution chain. 
In 2016, a Special Working Group on Fertilizer Subsidy Policy (Pokja Khusus Perumusan Kebijakan 
Subsidi Pupuk) set up by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs submitted to the House of 
Representatives (DPR RI) its recommendation to gradually phase out subsidies over three years. The 
Working Group presented two scenarios: complete subsidy removal by 2019 or a gradual reduction 
until only 20% of Pupuk Indonesia’s cost of goods sold (COGS) would remain subsidized from 2019 
onwards. The removal was to be compensated by increasing the government’s purchasing price 
of paddy (Harga Pembelian Pemerintah or HPP) by 5% annually. These recommendations were 
rejected by the House of Representatives (DPR RI, 2018; Susilowati, 2016).
Compensating for the removal of the subsidy by increasing the HPP may not sufficiently 
incentivize productivity and may even create other problems. CIPS studies have shown that the 
HPP is consistently below the market price at the farm gate (Octania, 2021; Respatiadi & Nabila, 
2017). An increase in HPP is always matched by an increase in the farm gate price. This suggests 
that private traders maintain their profit margins by undercutting the government’s ability to 
absorb paddy and rice (Graham, 2020). Increasing the HPP annually may lead to inflation via even 
higher rice prices for the consumers.
Political difficulties aside, the need to eliminate or phase out fertilizer subsidies is largely 
understood. The Special Working Group referenced the secondary market created by the price 
gap and fiscal savings as the main reasons for their recommendation (Susilowati, 2016). 
Eliminating fertilizer subsidies will not immediately equalize fertilizer prices. Aside from 
its advantages as a state-owned company, Pupuk Indonesia enjoys dominant position in the 
Indonesian fertilizer market. In 2020, its national market shares for urea, ammonia, and NPK 
were 99.59%, 80.90%, and 54.31% respectively. The company also has a sizable presence in 
Southeast Asia with the market shares of 51.10%, 25.00%, and 45.00% for urea, ammonia, and 
NPK (Pupuk Indonesia, 2021). The large investment needed to build fertilizer plants provides a 
barrier to entry, leading to a highly-concentrated chemical fertilizer market with few big players. 
With urea sales almost entirely held by Pupuk Indonesia, the other players are left vying for 
smaller market portions of NPK or other compound fertilizers, usually for plantations rather 
than food crops. 
Pupuk Indonesia’s dominant market position motivates smaller producers to constantly innovate 
by offering different textures and coloring, improved formulas, and varying nutrient composition 
in order to find their niche in the market. They include importers like PT Meroke Tetap Jaya, which 
runs a small NPK processing plant blending base fertilizer sourced from Pupuk Indonesia’s urea 
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with imported TSP and KCl. Despite its different size and target market, PT Meroke was confident 
that subsidy removal and the narrowing of the price gap will help them compete with the bigger 
players (Interview 9).
More recently, news outlets and official press releases reported that the DPR is calling for the 
removal of fertilizer subsidies and reallocation of the funds to output or price subsidies (DPR RI, 
2021; Koran Sindo, 2020). This represents a change in legislators’ position following President 
Joko Widodo’s open discontent over subsidy ineffectiveness in early 2021 (Sandi, 2021). At the 
Indonesia Food Summit 2021, the West Sumatra Governor also expressed support for reallocating 
fertilizer subsidies to fund farming output.10
Details about what form output subsidies would take are scarce. Policymakers understand output 
subsidies as a price support. The mechanism is understood to take one of the following forms: 
1) compensating farmers for the price gap when market price is below the HPP; or 2) rewarding 
farmers with payments per kilogram of output. Both mechanisms are flawed and unlikely to 
incentivize farmers to improve productivity. 
Based on analysis from Susilowati (2016), compensating farmers for the price gap may have little 
effect since the market price of paddy is rarely below the government’s HPP, as discussed above. 
Similarly, rewarding farmers for each kilogram of output would only provide farmers with a small 
margin (about IDR 97,000 per farmer per hectare of harvest, according to Susilowati (2016)) 
since the additional earning per kilogram of paddy would be offset by higher fertilizer prices. 
This assumes that the per-kilogram payments are financed exclusively with savings accrued 
from the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy. Increasing output subsidies would mean increasing 
the overall fiscal cost and would introduce the danger of overproduction. 
The European Union saw farm supplies exceeding domestic consumption, especially in the 
1980s, as a result of state interventions under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Since then, 
the CAP has abandoned market price supports in favour of direct payments. The CAP and its 
lessons are explained in Box 1.
10 A recording of the full-day event is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xvze9ZUMEw. The governor’s 
statement starts at around 02:14:00 mark.
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Box 1
The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: From Market Price Support
to Direct Payments to Producers
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) represents the largest single budget item in the 
EU (Scown et al., 2020). Launched in 1962, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) aims to 
support farmers, improve agricultural productivity, ensure a stable supply of affordable 
food, tackle climate change, establish sustainable natural resources management, 
and maintain rural areas and landscapes while keeping the rural economy alive by 
promoting jobs in the agriculture and food sector. (European Commission, n.d.).
The CAP has undergone several reforms. During its early implementation, the policy 
guaranteed domestic prices to encourage production. This successfully boosted food 
production via public buy-in at a guaranteed target price (European Commission, 2015). 
However, since prices were guaranteed regardless of market demand, the policy 
resulted in huge commodity surpluses, with essential food stocks piling up from the 
late 1970s until the early 1980s. Dairy surplus stocks reached 32.70 million tonnes of 
whole milk equivalent by the end of 1983, or 35% of total milk production (Trostle et al., 
1986). In Britain, the “butter mountain” led people to line up at local centers to obtain 
free EEC butter distributed through churches and charitable organizations for those in 
need, such as pensioners and the unemployed (Kirvan and Tuckman, 1987). Butter was 
redistributed at subsidized prices through Christmas butter sales and as exports to 
other countries, including the USSR (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2019). In 1983, agricultural 
expenditure consumed 65% or 15.92 million European Currency Unit (ECU) out of the 
total European Community spending of 24.58 million ECU (Trostle et al., 1986).
CAP’s first major reform in 1992 introduced a direct payment system and gradual 
reduction of price support. Direct payments were made based on the size of farms 
and the number of livestock. Farmers were also encouraged to switch to more 
environmentally-friendly farming practices (European Commission, 2018). In 2003, 
the EU introduced a mechanism known as “decoupling” through a second reform. This 
allowed farmers more freedom in answering to market demands as payments for the 
most part were no longer tied to the output type and amount produced.
Under the newest CAP reform in 2015, member states may still offer “coupled” 
support to maintain a certain production level in sectors or regions undergoing certain 
difficulties. Meanwhile, the per-hectare direct payment, which accounts for almost 70% 
of the total CAP budget, remains biased towards regions with high-income farmers 
and highest greenhouse gas emissions (Scown et al., 2020). In 2019, small European 
farmers protested for a gradual reduction in direct payments due to the perceived bias 
towards large farms (Schulz, 2019).
Despite its weaknesses and criticism, the CAP is unlikely to be eliminated in the near 
term. In fact, another reform targeting stronger environmental and climate aims is 
being discussed with a provisional start date of 1 January 2023.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
These proposed recommendations aim at reforming the 
government’s input interventions in order to: 
1. avoid unintentionally encouraging the overuse of 
urea and its adverse consequences on soil quality;
2. provide a competitive market for private input 
producers in order to ensure sustainable supplies 
of quality inputs at a quantity that allows producers 
to reduce their purchase prices; and
3. incentivize farmers to choose an input combination 
to support maximum productivity and move 
towards self-sufficiency rather than reliance on 
government assistance. 
These goals are achievable via subsidy removal and a transition to direct payments, with a view 
toward program graduation in the long term once the input market is developed and farmers’ 
input use and technological adoption reach their target levels.
These goals are achievable via 
subsidy removal and a transition 
to direct payments, with a view 
toward program graduation in 
the long term once the input 
market is developed and farmers’ 
input use and technological 
adoption reach their target levels.
Short- and Medium-Term Recommendations
These recommendations should be implemented for up to five years (a medium term in 
Indonesia’s development planning) after the start of transition to direct payments. Intervention 
in this period should be dedicated to incentivizing optimal input use decisions by providing 
direct cost support through Farmers Cards and preparing the market to provide a consistent 
amount of diverse, high-quality inputs at affordable prices.
Remove fertilizer subsidies to eliminate the price disparity, open 
up competition, and increase input choices for farmers.
Fertilizer subsidies should be removed for reasons echoed throughout the paper: the 
subsidies 1) are not effective and cost-efficient in encouraging productivity; 2) preserve 
suboptimal input use decisions by incentivizing farmers to opt for cheap inputs regardless 
of soil characteristics and nutrient needs; 3) discourage competition in the input market via 
price disparity and special appointment to Pupuk Indonesia; and 4) are prone to leakages 
and corruption due to the long application and distribution process. 
Since not all farmers have received the Farmer Cards, the first one to two years of the 
recommended pathway should allow for a gradual transition from the status quo to complete 
subsidy removal/direct payment. In this transitional period, MOA Regulation No. 28/2020 
and other related regulations should be revised to reduce the subsidized COGS gradually.
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Transition to direct payments paid via the Farmer Cards. 
Once fertilizer subsidies are fully eliminated, direct payments should be the MOA’s main tool 
for input intervention. Direct payments ensure farmers receive cost support while avoiding 
the downsides of subsidies. Direct payments are also superior to output subsidies, which 
are market-distorting and so expensive as to be unrealistic for Indonesia. Direct payments 
should fulfil the following criteria:
1. The direct payment takes the form of a single balance in the Farmer Card. Farmers 
can spend their balance on any fertilizer, seeds, pesticide, and other products sold at 
existing agricultural retailers (Kios Pertanian) without specific portions that must be 
spent on any given output. This levels the playing field for state-owned and private 
input producers by eliminating preferential treatment for Pupuk Indonesia and 
encourages farmers to base their input decisions on the specific input needs of their 
farms.
2. The direct payment amount should be based on a standardized farming cost 
reference, for example the average input costs per hectare by commodity (see Table 
1), which may be adjusted for regional differences.
3. A simpler application to determine eligibility should replace the e-RDKK requests. 
Farmers should annually declare their identity, land area managed, and type of 
commodity cultivated. This collected data would be simpler to collect and check—
for the most part administrative checks should be sufficient, eliminating on-farm 
verification except for significant changes or inactivity (balance unused)—and fewer 
actors would simplify the process. This should facilitate regular and predictable 
needs estimation, budget planning, and disbursement.
4. The balance represents monetary value but cannot be withdrawn as cash.
5. Existing rules for entitlement to fertilizer subsidies (farmers managing up to two 
hectares of land who are members of a Farmer Group) should be maintained as 
a basis for the direct payments, at least during the transition period when rising 
fertilizer prices may create shocks. In the future, the entitlement threshold may need 
to be re-adjusted based on the available budget and the relationship between land 
size and profitability.
Discontinue the Seed Assistance Program and focus on developing 
seed supplies. 
There is no need for an additional assistance program to promote adoption of high-yielding 
seeds. A past study from CIPS showed that the government’s free seeds programs and seed 
subsidies have been unsuccessful in promoting permanent adoption of hybrid rice seeds 
(Krishnamurti & Biru, 2019). This study also identified the issue with hybrid rice seeds as 
a supply side one, as marked by low production capacity. Public efforts should therefore 
be concentrated on the supply side, for example by collaborating with the private sector in 
research and development and relaxing seed import requirements.
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Improve farmer knowledge on input use. 
Not all problems of input use are attributable to farmers’ cost-based decisions in a distorted 
input market. Another challenge is information failure: inadequate information about input 
quality or the effects of different inputs makes them much less likely to be used well. 
Extension services, offered by private companies, are partly a corporate strategy to educate 
farmers about how to apply the right input products given the challenges that farmers 
are facing. PT Meroke, for example, deploys agronomists to train farmers—it is only by 
promoting the benefits of their more tailored products that they can compete with cheaper 
subsidized fertilizer beyond a narrow market niche. Therefore, large-scale extension 
services, including those provided by private input producers, should be more available to 
promote integrated crop management and good agricultural practices to farmers. 
Improve management of rural infrastructure and common resources.
Infrastructure also represents an important challenge. Public investments in large-scale 
reservoirs, canals, and tertiary irrigation systems need to be maintained. Equally important, 
Associations of Water-User Farmers (Perkumpulan Petani Pemakai Air or P3A) must have 
stronger institutional and entrepreneurial capacity to better manage the operations and 
management of tertiary irrigation. This should be done by improving the legal status of P3A 
to formalize its structure and responsibilities, by assisting P3As in developing operations and 
maintenance (O&M) procedures and service delivery standards, and by encouraging P3As to 
partner with local businesses to secure investments in water channel construction or pumps. 
Adjustments to the irrigation service fee in order to support the strengthened role of P3As 
should be considered. Most farmers do not pay irrigation service fees, but as discussed earlier, 
they are willing to pay higher fees than those they currently shirk if service is improved.
Improve entrepreneurial capacity.
Finally, while funding assistance for organic fertilizer plants might be useful to increase 
organic fertilizer use and create rural opportunities, sustainable use of the facility depends 
more on entrepreneurial initiatives from the community than government assistance. 
Farmers need access to finance, business training, and infrastructure supports such as 
internet for marketing and access to ports and warehousing. 
These recommendations on institutional strengthening and farmer’s enterprise are in 
line with MOA’s Strategic Plan (Rencana Strategis or Renstra) 2020–2024, where the 
strengthening of farmer enterprise (korporasi petani) is among its priority projects.
Program Graduation
A common drawback of assistance programs is that they tend to become permanent, creating 
reliance by recipients on these programs to always provide support and a perpetual drain on 
government coffers. A better approach is to recognize that interventions should have goals 
and deadlines. Once these goals are reached, or if the program proves incapable of achieving 
them by a predetermined deadline, there should be no reason to continue providing assistance.
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Graduation refers to the transition from input assistance (direct payment) to full market 
mechanism and/or other programs targeting different aspects of Indonesian agriculture beyond 
productivity. An example is environmental sustainability, where an incentive payment might be 
made dependent upon current and historical fulfilment of certain criteria, such as share of 
organic fertilizer use, lower farm emission from reduced urea use, controlled pesticide use, 
and crop rotation. Surveys or data gathered from the use of Farmer Cards may be leveraged to 
supply this information. It is thus important that the Farmer Card’s integrated data function be 
implemented consistently to support this long-term objective.
Program graduation as an exit strategy should be embedded in planning documents for MOA 
programs such as Renstra. In line with Indonesia’s planning terms, program graduation should 
kick off after five years of direct payment implementation. 
Elements of program graduation should include clear indicators of program achievement. They 
should be evaluated to determine whether the short- and medium-term recommendations 
have solved the initial market and information failures. The indicators should be designed to 
support an overall outcome. In this case, the desired outcome is that farmers possess and 
apply sufficient knowledge and means to use agricultural inputs more productively and begin 
to farm in a way that is sustainable without government support. This is verifiable through 
indicators such as share of farmers using fertilizer, farmers adopting new, high-yielding and/
or hybrid seed varieties, affordability of input prices on the free market, and improvements in 
soil fertility. 
Farmers or input markets in regions that have achieved these indicators should be considered 
“graduated”, at which point they should no longer receive direct payments. Program graduation 
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